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Abstract: 
Financial crises are an important concern today. One part of the problem is banking 
crises, at the root of which is the bank run problem. One solution is 100% reserve 
banking. But this is inefficient. The reasons are, however, not obvious.  
 
The literature on bank runs following Diamond and Dybvig (1983) is based on banks’ 
role in consumption smoothing. However, the earlier (rich) literature is based on banks’ 
role in issuing deposits, which are a component of money and are a source of credit. In 
this context, a high reserve ratio for commercial banks obviously decreases commercial 
bank credit. However, in general, it does not decrease total credit. Despite this, 100% 
reserve banking is inefficient if competitive banks have a comparative advantage over the 
central bank in providing credit. 
The paper ends by examining the implications of a decrease in gold reserves held by the 
central banks. 
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Financial crises are an important concern today in the developed countries (For more 
details on the current crisis (in 2007-08), see the exclusive issue on this crisis in Financial 
Stability Review, February, 2008, Banque de France.) So far, the Indian economy has not 
faced any such difficulties on a large scale (though some commercial banks in India have 
provided for losses in their exposure to derivatives). However, there is a lesson for the 
policy makers in India too. Parts of the financial sector in India have been liberalized 
considerably. It is possible that that some other parts of the financial system will be 
liberalized in the future (see Rajan 2008). While this liberalization is expected to improve 
efficiency, there is a possibility of Indian financial system becoming more vulnerable to 
instability than it has been in the past. In this context, it is important that we understand 
financial crises.     
 
One form that a financial crisis takes is a banking crisis. A specific and recent example of 
this is the failure of Northern Rock Bank in UK in 2008. Northern Rock is not an isolated 
case of a banking crisis in the world economy in recent times. The last few decades have 
witnessed several cases of banking crises almost all over the world. These have imposed 
a high cost to the economy. The cost of rescuing banks in several countries has been high 
- as high as 55% of GDP in Argentina (41% in Chile, 27% in S. Korea, and so on) 
(Klinebel and Laewen 2002). Banking sector problems have independent negative real 
effects (Ariccia, et al. 2008). 
 
What is a banking crisis? The problems of large non-performing assets on banks' balance 




banks imposed on the governments, loss of confidence in some banks in minds of the 
people, considerable flight to quality from some or all banks, and so on are clubbed under 
the heading of the banking crises problem these days. For analytical purposes, we need to 
be careful. There can be two problems. One is the root problem of a banking crisis. The 
other is the side-effects of policies to deal with the root problem. Often these two 
problems are clubbed together. There is a need to separate these two.  
 
In many countries, the governments provided deposit insurance and lender of last resort 
facilities. These policies were meant to protect depositors and ensure macroeconomic 
stability, which they did. However, they also had side-effects. They encouraged moral 
hazard in banks. Many banks accumulated large non-performing assets (NPAs). So in 
many cases NPAs are not the root problem though they attract a lot of attention in the 
media and even in policy making circles. They are simply the side-effect of a policy that 
is used to deal with the root problem. This paper is motivated by the root problem, and 
the root problem in many cases is one of bank runs.  
  
The literature on bank runs following Diamond and Dybvig (1983) has focused on inter-
temporal consumption smoothing. Much of this literature does not incorporate money
i. 
However, the earlier literature including classic works such as Thornton (1802), Bagehot 
(1873) and Friedman (1964) had a different framework and focus. The context was 
monetary stability - ensuring that amount of money in the economy is stable. This 
framework is still useful. This paper will follow this older tradition and focus on money 





A bank is vulnerable to a run because it has fractional reserves whereas its deposits can 
be withdrawn any time. One simple solution in this context is that banks adopt 100% 
reserve banking, or, sometimes also referred to as, unitary banking. This is inefficient. 
However, the reasons are not very obvious.   
 
The central bank in many countries imposes a cash reserve ratio (CRR) on a commercial 
bank. The more the CRR, the smaller is the credit that can be made available by the 
commercial banks in the economy. The extreme case is where CRR is 1 and commercial 
bank lending is zero. However, commercial banks are not the only source of credit 
creation. The central bank, too, creates credit in the process of issuing, what is usually 
referred to as, high-powered money or base money. For many purposes, we are interested 
in total credit creation rather than simply the credit created by commercial banks alone. 
So we may ask the question – Does a change in CRR have an effect on total credit? If 
yes, then does this effect hold in general? Or, are there conditions under which this is 
true?  
 
It may be argued that central bank credit should not be included in total credit. Usually 
the central bank provides funds to the government and the commercial banks lend to the 
private sector. However, this is not always true. The central bank may lend to the private 
sector (for example to private banks) and the commercial banks may lend to the 
government (or invest in government securities). The Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) in 




So we consider credit creation by both the commercial banks and the central bank.  It is 
true that apart from commercial banks and the central bank, there are various other 
financial institutions. But our interest lies in commercial banks and the central bank 
because other financial institutions are not usually involved in the payments system.  
 
In this paper, we will use an extended but simple version of the standard model of credit 
creation and money multiplier. For simplicity, we will assume full employment level of 
output. We will use the Quantity Theory of Money for determination of the price level. 
Again for simplicity, we consider demand for money as a function of previous period 
output, which is pre-determined. Current period output in our model is endogenous. It is a 
function of the total real credit creation in the economy.   
 
The standard model of credit creation and money multiplier incorporates reserves of the 
commercial banks. But the central bank also keeps reserves. It is interesting that some 
central banks have reduced their gold reserves in recent times. The official stock of gold 
with central banks has declined by about 10% between 1980 and 1999. Sellers included 
Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Australia, the United Kingdom, 
Portugal, and some Latin American countries (World Gold Council 2003). The sale of 
gold by central banks may continue in the future. What are the implications of this 
reduction in gold reserves of a central bank?  
 
This paper will show that the total real credit by the banking system (the central bank 




central bank keeps zero gold reserves. It follows immediately that total real credit 
creation under fractional reserve commercial banking is the same as that under unitary 
banking. However, if the central bank keeps positive gold reserves, then total real credit 
does vary with the cash reserve ratio maintained by commercial banks. Further, the 
magnitude of this effect of a change in cash reserve ratio on total real credit falls as the 
central bank decreases its gold reserves.  
 
Unitary banking received considerable attention after the banking crises in 1930s. It was 
advocated because it was run-proof (see Simons 1948; Bryan 1988). However, it was not 
adopted because it was considered obviously inefficient. We will see that the reasons are 
not very obvious.  
 
The standard model of credit creation and money multiplier deals with credit creation by 
commercial banks only. It does not include credit creation by the central bank (see, for 
example, Papademos and Modigliani 1990). What are the implications of including credit 
creation by the central bank?  
 
Foreign exchange reserves are held in many countries in the form of bonds and treasury 
bills of reputed foreign governments. So foreign exchange reserves may be viewed as 
‘credit given to foreign governments’. So the total of government bonds and foreign 
exchange reserves may be viewed as the total credit given to governments (domestic and 
foreign). For simplicity, we will focus on credit given by the central bank to domestic 





The plan of the paper is as follows. The standard model of credit creation by commercial 
banks is set out in section I. Output in section I is pre-determined. Section II includes the 
central bank in the model. Output in section II is endogenous. In section III we conclude. 
 
I THE MODEL  
For simplicity, consider a closed economy. We will use an extended version of the 
standard model of supply of money supply( ) M . The economy consists of commercial 
banks, the central bank, the government and the public. The central bank issues 
irredeemable high-powered money( ) H , which is demanded by public in the form of 
currency( ) C , and by commercial banks in the form of reserves( ) R . The commercial 
banks issue deposits ( ) D  and give out loans ( )
b L  after keeping a proportion  ( ) r  of 
deposits as reserves. We assume that 1 0 £ < r . If 1 < r , we have fractional reserve 
commercial banking. If  1 = r , we have unitary commercial banking. Currency and 
deposits are held in a fixed ratio ( ) c . Assume that 0 > c .  
 
Assume that high-powered money is exogenously given (H ). Since high-powered 
money consists of currency and reserves, it follows that   
R C H + = .                                                                                                                        (1)  
It follows from the above discussion that in equilibrium,  
cD C = ,                                                                                                                             (2)  




. ) 1 ( D r L
b - =                                                                                                                     (4)  
By the definition of money, we have 
D C M + = .                                                                                                                       (5)  
This is where the usual model of credit creation and money multiplier ends. Since our 
interest lies in real credit, we need to consider the price level( ) P  as well. We will use a 
simple version of the Quantity Theory of Money for this purpose. Money illusion is 
absent, by assumption. The demand for real money is a function of output. However, for 
simplicity, we consider a one period lag. We assume that the demand for money in the 
current period is a function of output in the previous period. Let  1 - Y  be the output in the 
economy in the previous period. Since  1 - Y  is pre-determined, the model remains simple. 
In equilibrium,   
1 - = kPY M ,                                                                                                                        (6) 
where k  is a behavioral parameter. We will later treat the current period output (Y ) as an 
endogenous variable. But to keep the model simple, in (6), we have used 1 - Y  instead ofY . 
At this stage, let us consider a well known and very straightforward result in the 
literature:  
 
Credit created by commercial banks decreases with cash reserve ratio.  
 
Though the proof is well known and straightforward, we restate it here for later reference 
and comparison. We will first consider nominal credit and thereafter consider real credit. 













.                                                                                                                    (7)      
It is easy to check that 0 ) / ( < ¶ ¶ r L
b . Similarly solving for C and D from (1) to (4), and 
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.                                                                                                                  (9) 
This implies that 0 ] / [ < ¶ ¶ r P L
b . This completes the proof of the proposition that 
(nominal as well as real) credit creation by the commercial banks falls with cash reserve 
ratio. This proposition has an obvious corollary:  
 
Credit created by the commercial banks under fractional reserve banking is greater than 
that under unitary banking.  
 
We will need this for later reference. In this section, we have reconsidered the standard 
model and restated the well known effect of a change in cash reserve ratio on credit 
creation by commercial banks. In this section, output was treated as a pre-determined 
variable. In the next section, we will consider the banking system that includes not only 
the commercial banks but also the central bank. We will also treat output as an 






II REAL CREDIT CREATION BY THE BANKING SYSTEM  
This section will include the central bank in the model. Assume that the central bank has 
only two assets viz. loans (
c L ) and gold reserves. Let  g  be the proportion of the central 
bank assets held in the form of gold reserves. The central bank, it is assumed, has only 
one liability viz. central bank money, which is sometimes referred to as base money or 
high-powered money. Recall that we have assumed that the high-powered money is 
exogenously given. So the nominal credit creation by the central bank is given by    
H g L
c ) 1 ( - = .                                                                                                                 (10)  
Next, let us consider output. Recall that in the previous section, we considered output 
with one period lag. This was pre-determined. Let us now consider the current period 
output ( ) Y  in the economy. The current period output is an endogenous variable. The 
current period output in the economy is a function of current period real credit creation 
by the commercial banks and by the central bank. Let  
)), / ( ) / ( ( P L P L f Y
c c b b a a + =                                                                                       (11) 
where
b a and 
c a are the respective proportions of commercial bank credit and of central 
bank credit that are used for productive purposes. If
c b a a > , it means that relatively 
more commercial bank loans are used for productive purposes than in the case of central 
bank loans, and vice-versa. If
c b a a = , it means that the effect of commercial bank loans 
on output is the same as that of central bank loans on output. We may interpret 
b a and 
c a  as measures of efficiency with which commercial bank funds and central bank funds 





In this model,  1 - Y  is pre-determined. So there are eight variables in the model viz. 
P L L M R D C
c b , , , , , ,  andY . We have eight equations from (1) to (6) and from (10) to 
(11). We can now state our first result formally.   
 
Proposition 1 Total real credit decreases with cash reserve ratio if the central bank 
keeps positive gold reserves. Total real credit is invariant to a change in cash reserve 
ratio if the central bank keeps zero gold reserves.  
 
Proof: From (8) and (10), we have  
1 1









                                                                                                   (12) 
From (9) and (12), total real credit is given by  
1 1
) )( 1 ( ) 1 (
- +
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-                                                                                           (14) 
This implies that  
0 , 0

























We have shown that total real credit varies with the cash reserve ratio if the central bank 
keeps gold reserves. So far we have considered reserve ratios (r  and g ) as determinants 
of credit. Another determinant of nominal credit is high-powered money. How does real 
credit vary with respect to high-powered money? Observe from (9) and (12) that real 
credit created is invariant to high-powered money. This is not surprising, given our 
model. But for comparison of the effect of a change in high-powered money on total real 
credit with the effect of a change in cash reserve ratio on total real credit, observe from 
(9) and (12) that  0 , 0













. So it does not matter whether  g  is 
greater than or equal to zero as far as the impact of a change in high-powered money on 
real credit is concerned. But it does matter whether  g  is positive or zero as far as the 
impact of a change in cash reserve ratio on total real credit is concerned (Proposition 1).  
 
Let us now see the implications of Proposition 1 for the debate on fractional reserve 
banking  ) 1 ( < r  vis-à-vis unitary banking ) 1 ( = r .  
 
Corollary 1: If 0 = g , total real credit created by the banking system under fractional 
reserve banking is the same as that under unitary banking.  
 
Proof: From proof of Proposition 1, we have  0







 if 0 = g . Corollary 1 





Let us now compare Corollary 1 with the corollary in section I. The latter stated that 
commercial bank credit creation is greater under fractional reserve banking than under 
unitary banking. But if we consider the banking system as a whole, then it is no longer 
true in general that the credit creation decreases with cash reserve ratio. Real credit 
creation by the banking system decreases with cash reserve ratio if and only if 0 > g . 
If 0 = g , real credit creation by the banking system is the same, whether there is 
fractional reserve banking or unitary banking (Corollary 1).  
 
In Corollary 1, we have compared credit creation under the regime of fractional reserve 
banking and under unitary banking. Let us next consider the welfare implications. For 
simplicity, let us consider output as a measure of welfare.  
 
Corollary 2: If  0 = g  and
c b a a = , then output under unitary banking is the same as 
output under fractional reserve banking.     
 
Proof: Substituting 
c b a a =  in (11), we get 
), / ] ([ ( P L L f Y
c b b + = a  if
c b a a = . 
Using (13), we get 
), ( 1 - = kY f Y
b a if 
c b a a =  and 0 = g .  
Observe that Y is invariant to r if





In Corollary 1 and in Corollary 2, we have seen the implication of  0 = g  for credit and 
for output respectively. Let us now consider the case 0 > g . What is the effect of a 
change in the reserve ratio of the central bank ( g ) on the impact of the change in cash 
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change with respect to g ?   
 
Proposition 2 Assume that 0 > g . The absolute impact of a change in commercial banks’ 
cash reserve ratio on total real credit is a monotonically increasing function of the 
central bank’s gold reserve ratio. 
 
Proof: From (14), it immediately follows that 0
) 1 (




















completes the proof.  
 
We have thus shown that the impact of a change in cash reserve ratio of commercial 
banks on total real credit depends on the gold reserves that the central bank maintains. 
The more the gold reserves of the central bank, the greater is the impact of a change in 
cash reserve ratio of commercial banks on total real credit. As mentioned already, in 
recent times, some central banks have reduced their gold reserves. This implies that in 
any of these countries, the central bank cannot use the instrument of cash reserve ratio as 
effectively as it did in the past. So the policy of a fall in gold reserves has implications for 





Let us make a few observations. First, if  1 = g  and 1 = r , then total real credit creation is 
zero (see (13)). The intuition is straightforward. In this case, effectively, gold is the 
medium of exchange since all money is directly or indirectly fully backed by gold. 
Currency is directly backed by gold. But observe that indirectly bank deposits are also 
backed by gold. The reason is that since 1 = r , it follows that deposits are 100% backed 
by reserves held by commercial banks in the form of (central bank) money, which is in 
turn 100% backed by gold. On the other hand, if 0 = g , then the total credit creation is 
1 ) ( - = + kY P L L
c b  (see (13)). Observe that  1 / - = kY P M  (see (6)). Since total real credit 
creation against real money issued by the banking system cannot exceed the amount of 
real money, it follows that total real credit creation is maximum when 0 = g . Observe 
that this is true regardless of the value that r  takes. Again the intuition is straightforward. 
Money takes two forms viz. currency and deposits. If 0 = g , there is no gold backing for 
currency issued by the central bank so this gives scope for credit creation by the central 
bank to the extent that currency is issued. The remaining money is commercial bank 
deposits. Against these deposits, commercial banks hold loans and reserves. So there is 
scope for credit creation by commercial banks to the extent that the commercial banks do 
not hold reserves. But observe that that the reserves held by the commercial banks are in 
the form of (central bank) money, which is not backed by gold at all if 0 = g . The central 
bank holds loans entirely instead of holding any gold. So the central bank creates credit 
instead of the commercial banks against the reserves held by the commercial banks. 
Therefore, the reserve ratio observed by the commercial banks affects the composition of 




the commercial banks, the less the credit creation by the commercial banks but the more 
the credit creation by the central bank. So the total real credit creation is constant 
if 0 = g . 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Figure 1 shows the effect of reserve ratio (r ) on total real credit creation ( P L L
c b / ) ( + ). 
On x-axis and y-axis, we have r  and  P L L
c b / ) ( +  respectively. Line segments AB, CD 
and EF represent the cases 0 = g ,  1 0 < < g  and  1 = g  respectively. AB is horizontal 
since the total real credit is invariant to the cash reserve ratio of commercial banks. The 
height of AB represents the maximum credit creation that is possible. CD lies below AB 
because  g  is no longer zero so that the central bank cannot create credit fully against the 
money that it issues. CD is downward sloping because with 0 > g , a higher r permits a 
lower total real credit creation. Finally, EF represents the case of least credit creation. 
Observe that EF intersects the x-axis at 1 = r . So total real credit creation is zero 
if 1 = = g r . Observe that in general  1 = r  does not imply that  0 / ) ( = + P L L
c b  (see the 
case of AB and CD). Further, observe that the position of CD depends on the value ofg . 
The lower the g , the higher is the position of CD. Moreover, the lower the g , the flatter is 
the segment CD. This is the graphical representation of Proposition 2 that the absolute 
impact of a change in cash reserve ratio on total real credit falls as  g  falls. As 0 ﬁ g , the 





Much of the literature has focused on nominal credit created by commercial banks. 
Though there is a fairly long history of the ideas of credit creation, Phillips (1921) was a 
pioneering attempt at a somewhat formal model of credit creation. But there is hardly any 
discussion of the credit created by the central bank or of the effect of commercial bank 
credit creation on the price level. There is a similar omission of total real credit creation 
in Gurley and Shaw (1960), Towey (1974), Wilson (1992), and Humphrey (1992). This 
omission is also witnessed in many textbooks (for example, Mankiw 1997). On the other 
hand, Fama (1980) and Fama (1983) bring central bank money, commercial banks’ 
deposits and the price level together but their focus is different. These two papers do not 
discuss credit creation. King and Plosser (1984) consider money, credit and prices but 
their analysis is in the context of a real business cycle. There is no central bank credit in 
their model. Kennedy (2000) is a useful reading on distinction between nominal and real 
magnitudes. However, Kennedy does not consider this distinction in the context of credit 
creation. In this paper, both the price level and the central bank credit have been included 
in the analysis. 
 
III CONCLUSION 
It is widely believed that credit created under fractional reserve banking is greater than 
that under unitary banking. It is usually not made clear whether we are considering 
nominal credit or real credit. It is also not clear if we are considering commercial bank 
credit alone or total credit. We have examined these issues in this paper. Our result is as 
follows. If the central bank holds positive gold reserves, then the total real credit creation 




However, if the central bank holds zero gold reserves, then the total real credit creation 
under fractional reserve banking is no different from that under unitary banking. 
Furthermore, if the credit created by the central bank is used as productively as the credit 
created by the commercial banks, then the output in the economy under fractional reserve 
banking is the same as that under unitary banking, if the central bank keeps zero gold 
reserves.  
 
One result on comparative statics is as follows. The lower the gold reserves of the central 
bank, the less is the impact of a given change in commercial banks’ cash reserve ratio on 
total real credit created by the banking system. In the extreme case where the central bank 
does not keep any gold reserves, the impact of a change in cash reserve ratio on total real 
credit is zero. So cash reserve ratio could cease to be a tool of credit policy if the central 
bank switches to a regime of zero gold reserves. It is important to keep in mind that at 
present, cash reserve ratio is a useful tool because the central bank keeps gold reserves. 
So any change in the policy of the central bank to reduce gold reserves has important 
implications. Many European countries have reduced their gold reserves.  
 
In this paper, we have used comparative statics to arrive at our results. We have also 
assumed flexible prices. Some of our results are strong for these reasons. It is possible 
that our results will get somewhat diluted if we relax these assumptions.  
 
Fractional reserve banking developed at a time when gold standard prevailed and central 




commercial banks took the form of gold. The higher the reserve ratio maintained by 
commercial banks, the less the credit that banks could give out. So in such a monetary 
and banking system, 100% reserve banking was indeed obviously inefficient. However, at 
present, reserves of commercial banks are not kept in the form of gold. Instead, these are 
held in the form of central bank money. The latter is backed primarily by government 
bonds and foreign exchange reserves in many countries. Gold reserves with central banks 
are very small these days. Government bonds and foreign exchange reserves may be 
viewed as ‘credit given to the government - domestic and foreign’.  
 
Reserves of commercial banks do decrease credit given by commercial banks but these 
reserves are used to finance credit given by the central bank. So the central bank credit 
creation goes up with an increase of cash reserve ratio of commercial banks. So there is 
little or no overall decrease in total credit given by the banking system (the commercial 
banks plus the central bank) if the cash reserve ratio of commercial banks is varied. 
However, the quality of lending by the commercial banks may be different from that by 
the central bank. If so, then positive reserves with commercial banks in general and 100% 
reserves in particular will have efficiency implications. Observe that this argument is 
very different from the simple (or even naïve) argument that 100% reserve banking is 
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i Some recent papers have included money in this framework, but it still does not occupy 
centre-stage (see Diamond and Rajan 2003). 